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Flypaper effect is a well-known phenomenon in public finance 
with regard to intergovernmental transfer. It exists when an 
increase in grants is more stimulative than a similar increase in 
income towards the local government (recipient’s) expenditure. 
Numerous studies had occurred to both identify the existence 
of flypaper effect as well as to determine the cause. Most 
researchers worldwide disagree about the existence and even 
more disagree upon different results regarding the existence 
and the cause of different results. Two studies had been done 
in Indonesia within municipalities and they resulted in differing 
conclusions of the existence. This study is meant to identify 
flypaper effect within provincial level using what is hoped to be 
the proper way to investigate the existence. 
 
Efek flypaper adalah fenomena terkenal dalam keuangan 
publik berkaitan dengan transfer antar pemerintah. Ini terjadi 
ketika kenaikan hibah lebih bersifat stimulatif daripada 
peningkatan pendapatan yang serupa terhadap pengeluaran 
pemerintah daerah (penerima). Sejumlah penelitian telah 
terjadi untuk mengidentifikasi adanya efek flypaper sekaligus 
untuk mengetahui penyebabnya. Sebagian besar peneliti di 
seluruh dunia tidak setuju tentang keberadaan dan bahkan 
lebih tidak setuju atas hasil yang berbeda mengenai 
keberadaan dan penyebab hasil yang berbeda. Dua penelitian 
telah dilakukan di Indonesia di dalam kotamadya dan 
menghasilkan kesimpulan yang berbeda mengenai eksistensi 
tersebut. Penelitian ini dimaksudkan untuk mengidentifikasi 
efek flypaper di tingkat provinsi dengan menggunakan cara 
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Flypaper is a sticky paper used to catch flies; 
hence the name flypaper. The flypaper effect is a 
term initially introduced by Courant, et. al. (1979) and 
was used to characterize  Arthur M. Okun’s statement 
that ‘money sticks where it hits.’ The statement 
means that intergovernmental grants (grants 
transferred by central to local governments) 
stimulates local government expenditures more than 
an equal increase in the private income within the 
localities. Such an observation is contrary to the 
implications of the basic theory of intergovernmental 
grants (Fisher 2007), which suggests that private 
income and lump sum grants should have the same 
effect on the size of government expenditures. 
There has been little research regarding the 
flypaper effect in Indonesia. One study was 
conducted by Diah Ayu Kusumadewi and Arief 
Rahman (2007) and used municipalities’ data 
consisting of Local Government Expenditure (LGE), 
Block Grant (BG), and Local Government Own-Source 
Revenue (OSR) from 2001 – 2004. They concluded 
that both BG and OSR affect LGE significantly. 
Another study was conducted by Sampurna 
Budi Utama and Syahrul (2011). They used panel data 
consisting of LGE, OSR, Regional Gross Domestic 
Products (RegGDP), and Unconditional Grant (UG), 
which is the same as BG, for municipalities from the 
years 2005 – 2009. The researchers concluded that 
the flypaper effect did not occur since the coefficient 
estimate for OSR is higher than for UG; their results 
were statistically significant.  
Due to the contradictory results, it is of 
interest to further investigate whether a flypaper 
effect occurs in Indonesia. In this research the 
flypaper effect is measured by comparing the effect 
of grants and the effect of income on government 
expenditures. If the former exceeds the latter, then a 
flypaper effect exists. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The questions that we are going to analyze are 
as follow: 
1. Do Income per Capita (IncCap) and Block Grant 
per Capita (BGCap) affect Local Government 
Expenditure per Capita (ExpCap) within 
provinces in Indonesia? 
2. Does Block Grant per Capita affect Expenditure 
per Capita more than Income per Capita affect 
ExpCap within provinces in Indonesia? In other 
words, does the grant effect exceed the income 
effect? 
3. Is there evidence of a flypaper effect in 
provinces in Indonesia? 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Intergovernmental Grant  
In the United States (US) there are two sources 
of the intergovernmental grants. The first are grants 
from the Federal Government which mainly go to 
state government, and grants from the State to the 
local governments. In Indonesia grants comes solely 
from the central government transferred either to 
the provincial government, which has a similar level 
with the state government in US, or straight to the 
municipalities that are the local governments in 
Indonesia. There are only two subnational 
government levels in Indonesia.  
According to Ron Fisher (2007), there are four 
purposes of grants, namely: 
 Grants may be used to correct for externalities 
under provision of government services that 
generate positive externalities (the service 
benefits or tax costs that cross jurisdiction 
boundaries) in order to improve the efficiency of 
fiscal decisions. 
 Grants can be used for explicit redistribution of 
resources. 
 Grants can be used to substitute the tax structure 
of one government for the tax structure of 
another government. 
 Grants are considered as macroeconomic 
stabilizing mechanism for the sub-national 
government sector. 
There are four factors of grants as follow: 
 General or Specific Purpose 
The general purpose grant is the unconditional or 
block grant. The recipients are free to use the 
grants based on their own discretion. On the 
other hand, the specific purpose grant is the 
earmarked grant. The purpose is stated clearly by 
the superior government who transferred the 
grant and cannot be used for any other purpose.  
 Formula-Based or Project-Based 
Block grants are usually formula based, the 
amount transferred to the recipient 
governments is calculated accordingly. The 
central or federal governments specify the 
factors comprising the formula; these factors 
usually consist of several basic characteristics of 
the local government, such as population, area, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), income, etc. The 
earmarked grants are usually project-based and 
thus their amounts are based on the necessities 
of the project. However, the earmarked grant 
can also be based on formula. For instance, the 
transfer from the Ministry of Education in 
Indonesia to local governments with the purpose 
of subsidizing school in providing free education 
is based on the number of students in each 
localities as well as the price index of education 
in each regions. 
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 Matched or Unmatched by Local Government 
Own-Source Revenue 
The grants may require a certain amount of fund 
be provided by the local governments to help 
financing the purpose of the grants; under this 
circumstance the grant is called a matching grant. 
Such a case is usually a feature of earmarked 
grants. On the other hand, block grant does not 
commonly require funds to be provided by the 
local governments that are receiving the grant 
because the fundamental purpose of block grant 
is ordinarily to finance the provision of basic 
services by the local governments.  
 Size Limit 
A grant can be limited or unlimited. The 
unlimited grant, also known as the open-ended 
grant, is one in which the total grant depends on 
the number of units eligible for the service or the 
total expenditures on some service.  For 
example, an open-ended education grant 
increases with the number of students,  while an 
open-ended matching grant depends on the total 
amount spent by the local government for its 
own revenue. In practice, such type of grant is 
not commonly enacted. Grants are usually 
limited either by total amount allocated within 
the annual national budget or by enacting a 
limitation towards the amount of grants 
allocated for each local government every year. 
One of the microeconomics principles related 
to grants is regarding price (substitution) effect and 
income effect. A price effect is when a decrease in 
price causes increase in consumption due to lower 
cost. Conversely, an income effect is when an 
increase in income causes increase in consumption 
because the consumer feels wealthier. 
Intergovernmental transfer bears price effect 
because it is often use to induce the recipient 
governments to increase the quantity of goods and 
services provided. The incentive to increase provision 
of public goods and services happens because the 
marginal cost of increasing quantity becomes cheaper 
with grants thus consumers pay cheaper price. Yet 
subsequently the burden of transferring fund from 
the central to subnational governments is shown as 
an increase in tax burden by taxpayers. The higher 
burden of tax creates a decrease in disposable income 
which leads to income effect such that individuals 
(consumers) feel less wealthy. Both price and income 
effects balance out the net consumption effect of 
grants thus theoretically we should not predict an 
increase in consumption or expenditure due to 
grants. 
 
2.2 Flypaper Effect 
Flypaper effect shows that intergovernmental 
grants exhibit an increase in consumption or 
expenditure. The flypaper effect pertains to the case 
of unmatched grants. The effect is considered to exist 
when grant is more stimulative towards the recipient 
governments’ expenditures than their income. 
According to Fisher (2007), a matching grant is more 
stimulating than a lump-sum grant because the 
former decreases the marginal cost of adding 
expenditure while the latter is merely increasing the 
available resources. Therefore, because a matching 
grant is more stimulative that an unmatched grant, 
one cannot attribute the increase in expenditure 
from a matching grant to a flypaper effect. 
The increase in quantity demanded of public 
service is higher when the price is lower happens due 
to the availability of grant rather than increase in 
income that increases citizen’s buying capability. In 
analyzing the grant-related governmental policy, the 
existence of a flypaper effect can be identified by 
regressing expenditures against a measure of grant 
revenue and a measure of income. If an increase in 
grant revenue is estimated to increase government 
expenditures by more than a similar increase in 
income, it may be concluded that the flypaper effect 
exists.  
Previous research (see Hines and Thaler 1995 
for a discussion) tried to explain how results showing 
either existence or non-existence of a flypaper effect 
could be due to errors in the analysis. Specification 
error may happen, such as the failure to acknowledge 
that the local governments with high spending 
propensities are more likely to be classified as an 
unconditional grants receiver in the first place. 
Therefore, such governments will continue to receive 
increasing grants and subsequently increase their 
expenditures. On the other hand, researchers have to 
be careful in setting the proxies of income and price 
effects as well as including other explanatory 
variables to help explain the phenomena and avoid 
misspecification problems. 
Several theories (see Hines and Thaler 1995 
for a discussion) have been proposed to explain the 
existence of flypaper effect. One of the theories is the 
fiscal illusion created by grants which in essence is 
similar with price effect. When the price of public 
service is cheaper government may overprovide the 
service and citizens may overuse them. The net result 
is the necessity to provide the service even more in 
the subsequent years. On the other hand, the 
bureaucratic theory states that the political aspect of 
government may induce the leaders and decision 
makers to increase the expenditure in providing 
public service in order to seem favorable in society’s 
point of view. The increase in expenditure requires an 
increase in grants and vice versa. All in all, flypaper 
effect may or may not exist, and when it exists, there 
are a handful of theories to base its existence. 
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2.3 Law Number 33/2004 
In Indonesia, the law (Undang-undang or UU) 
that is currently enacted regarding the financial 
balance between central and local governments is the 
law number 33/2004, which replaced the previous 
law number 25/1999 within the same regard and 
bears a similar title. As stated in the law, financial 
balance between the central and local governments 
is meant to fund the decentralization role of the local 
governments by considering the localities potential, 
condition, and needs. Under the law local 
government income consists of Own-Source Revenue 
(OSR), Balancing Fund (BF), and other incomes. 
The Balancing Fund consists of Revenue 
Shared (RS), Block Grants (BG), and Earmarked Grants 
(ES). The Revenue Shared partially comprises of the 
local governments’ revenues; revenues shared 
between central and local governments from mining 
and local taxes (i.e. property tax and advertisement 
tax). Therefore, there is a comprehensive rule upon 
the calculation of RS between the central and its 
related local (province and municipality) 
governments. 
The block grant allocated in each year has to 
be at least 26% of the national domestic revenue 
portion in the annual budget. Block grants are 
allocated based on the fiscal disparity of each local 
government. Fiscal disparity is the sum of basic 
allocation and fiscal gap. The basic allocation is the 
total salary of the local government officers within 
each localities. Fiscal needs are the amount of money 
needed to finance the basic public service. Local 
government fiscal needs are calculated based on 
population, area, RegGDP, Construction Price Index 
(CPI), and Human Capital Development Index (HCDI). 
Fiscal capacity is the sum of local governments’ OSR 
and RS. The fiscal gap is the difference between fiscal 
need and capacity. In the end the block grant for each 
province is calculated based on the weight of the 
province times the total block grant for all provinces. 
The weight is determined by the ratio of fiscal gap of 
the province relative to the total fiscal gaps of every 
province. 
An earmark Grant (EG) is used to fund specific 
projects as stated by the central government. Hence, 
not every localities receive EG and when they do, they 
do not necessarily receive another EG in the 
subsequent year. In other words unlike BG, EG is not 
necessarily to be an annual transfer. Therefore, due 
to the random nature of EG, it is excluded in the 
estimation to test for the occurrence of flypaper 
effect. 
 
2.4 Previous Research in Indonesia 
A few studies had been conducted to 
investigate the existence of flypaper effect in 
Indonesia. The first study in 2007 used Ordinary Least 
Squared (OLS) Pooled Cross Section-Multiple Linear 
Regression (MLR) to look at the effects of Own-Source 
Revenue (OSR) and Block Grants (BG) on Local 
Government Expenditures (LGE) within the panel 
data of municipalities from 2001 – 2004, a 4 year time 
span. In this case they were using OSR as the proxy of 
the government’s income effect and BG as the proxy 
of grant effect. The researchers did not use any other 
control variable. 
The researchers hypothesized that if BG has a 
higher coefficient estimate than OSR’s, it indicates 
the existence of flypaper effect. The researchers’ 
methodology in testing the hypothesis is comparing 
the t-statistics of the two variables, OSR and BG. This 
is an incorrect way of testing such hypothesis because 
the individual t-statistics merely explains whether 
each independent variable significantly affect the 
dependent variable. The correct methodology is by 
testing the significance of the difference between the 
two variables with the post-estimation command 
within the statistical software.  
The post estimation testing method is 
important because the regression estimates are 
merely showing whether the individual independent 
variables affect the dependent variable and the 
magnitude of the individual effect. Simple addition or 
deduction of the independent variables magnitudes 
does not say anything about the significance of the 
difference between the variables in affecting the 
dependent variable. However, the research shows 
that both OSR and BG affect LGE significantly and the 
t-statistic value for BG is higher than for OSR in their 
regressions with LGE, thus it was concluded that 
flypaper effect exists within local governments in 
2001 – 2004. As I have discussed, it can be a false 
conclusion due to the incorrect hypothesis testing 
method. In addition to that, the use of OLS in 
implementing a regression analysis of panel data may 
bear the problem of endogeneity and 
heteroskedasticy of the model, which then put the 
results in questions of bias and inconsistency.  
Another research was conducted by Utama 
and Syahrul in 2011. They were investigating 
municipal data regarding LGE, OSR, BG, and RegGDP 
from 2005 – 2009, another 4 year time span. In this 
research they used OSR and RegGDP as the proxies of 
income effect and BG as the proxy of grant effect 
towards LGE. The result of their Fixed Effect Panel 
Data Analysis approach showed that the coefficient 
estimate for OSR is higher than for BG and RegGDP 
(βOSR > βBG > βRegGDP) and all of the estimates were 
significant. Additionally, the researchers concluded 
that flypaper effect does not exist. However, the 
methodology of testing the flypaper effect hypothesis 
was not clearly explained, though it can be inferred 
that the methodology was also by comparing the 
coefficient magnitudes of the independent variables. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Scope 
The first aspect that is going to be analyzed 
throughout this research is whether Income per 
Capita (IncCap) and Block Grant per Capita (BGCap) 
affect the Local Government Expenditure per Capita 
(ExpCap) within provinces in Indonesia in 2004 – 
2010. The second is to know which of the two 
variables (IncCap and BGCap) has a greater effect 
towards ExpCap. The last but most important is to 
investigate the existence of flypaper effect. 
After the financial crisis that hits Indonesia 
among other Asian countries in 1997 – 1998, 
Indonesian government has been implementing 
reformation era that started in 1999. The reformation 
covered every public sectors including local 
governance through decentralization policy. The 
policy encourages many localities to form new local 
governments in order to manage the provision of 
public goods and services within smaller jurisdictions. 
Because of that, after the separation of East Timor to 
be an independent country in 1999, Indonesia had 
gone from 26 provinces to 34 provinces to have more 
decentralized governance. The latest province is 
Kalimantan Utara (North Borneo) is established in 
2012, while the second latest province is Sulawesi 
Barat (West Sulawesi) that was established in 
October 2004. However, the 30 provinces included in 
the sample are the provinces that were established 
prior to 2001 and not created by dividing the existing 
province. Thus they are well established within 2004 
– 2010 research period. The name of the 6 new 
provinces and their forming dates is enlisted in Table 
1.
 
Table 1. Indonesia New Provinces (After Decentralization Commencement) 
No. Province Name Forming Date 
1. Maluku Utara (North Maluku)  October 4, 1999. 
2. Banten October 17, 2000. 
3. Kepulauan Bangka Belitung (Bangka Belitung Islands) December 4, 2000. 
4. Gorontalo December 22, 2000. 
5. Papua Barat (West Papua) November 21, 2001. 
6. Kepulauan Riau (Riau Islands) October 25, 2002. 
7. Sulawesi Barat (West Sulawesi) October 5, 2004. 
8. Kalimantan Utara (North Borneo) October 25, 2012. 
 
 
However, due to administrative issue not all of 
the new provinces that were formed after 1999 are 
having a complete data for 2004 – 2010. North 
Borneo does not have any data available. 
Additionally, there are three provinces that do not 
have population data; namely West Papua, Riau 
Islands, and West Sulawesi; thus they are also 
excluded from the dataset. Two provinces among the 
rest 30 provinces; namely Kalimantan Tengah 
(Central Borneo) and Sulawesi Tenggara (South-East 
Sulawesi) has missing value for expenditure in 2004 
that may due to incomplete reporting to the central 
government. Therefore, the incomplete observation 
(xkit; province in a certain year) that has missing value 
of the variables are not included in the regression and 
the dataset is considered to be unbalanced. However, 
the dataset is considered to still be representing 
national level because 28 provinces that are 




The data were gathered from the Directorate 
General of Financial Balance (DGFB) the Ministry of 
Finance of Indonesian Republic as well as Central 
Statistical Agency (CSA) of the Indonesian Republic 
websites. The data taken from DGFB consists of 
expenditures and block grants as stated in the Budget 
Realization Reports that are submitted annually by 
the local governments to DGFB. The reports are the 
provincial government reports. The data taken from 
CSA consists of Regional GDP and Population by 
provinces.  
The Regional GDP data available from CSA’s 
website were only from 2004 – 2010 which is why the 
research became bordered within those years. The 
population data is used to compute the per capita 
level of both dependent and independent variables. 
Unfortunately, data with regards to Price Index is not 
available for provinces. However the Fixed Effect 
Panel Data Regression that is used in this research 
deals with endogeneity problems. The level term data 
was also converted into their natural log forms to 
implement regression analyses with regard to 
percentage changes. 
There are four outlying observations that are 
being dropped from the datasets, namely the 
Gorontalo and Maluku Utara (North Maluku) 
provinces in 2009 and 2010. Gorontalo’s value of 
ExpCap in 2009 and 2010 were 30.6 and 78.5 
respectively while the average value of ExpCap from 
2004 – 2008 is approximately 0.54. On the other 
hand, the value of Maluku Utara’s ExpCap in 2009 and 
2010 were 46.5 and 187 respectively while the 
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average value is approximately 0.65. The value of 
IncCap and BGCap in 2009 and 2010 for both 
provinces were similarly a lot higher than the mean 
value of both variables within 2004 – 2008.  
It is possible that both provinces receive a high 
level of grants within those years since they are 
provinces that remotely located in eastern Indonesia 
and rather newly formed (Maluku was formed in 
1999 and Gorontalo was formed in 2000). Yet other 
relatively new provinces that were formed after the 
reformation era in 1999 were not receiving similar 
high grants. However, it is impossible for either 
province to experience boom in their incomes as 
shown in the Regional GDP values that were reflected 
into IncCap value. Considering there is no formal 
explanation of the reason behind high values, those 
observations were being dropped from the datasets. 
The summary statistics of each variable in both level 
and log terms are provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables in Level Forms 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
ExpCap Overall 3.632207 13.1555 0.0208333 164 N =     202 
  Between  6.636279 0.3022459 27.83068 n =      30 
  Within  11.49031 -23.73733 139.8015 T-bar = 6.73333 
          
IncCap Overall 2.733706 10.94499 0.0172414 126 N =     202 
  Between  4.80004 0.3222044 21.27891 n =      30 
  Within  9.955096 -18.29132 107.4548 T-bar = 6.73333 
      
BGCap Overall 3.156176 13.70341 0.0092593 179 N =     202 
  Between  5.898807 0.5020826 30.1045 n =      30 
  Within  12.52068 -26.78166 152.0517 T-bar = 6.73333 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables in Level Forms (continued) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
lexpcap Overall 4.50E-09 1.439901 -3.871201 5.099866 N =     202 
  Between  0.9613365 -1.373279 3.171733 n =      30 
  Within  1.080478 -3.863492 4.696338 T-bar = 6.73333 
          
linccap Overall -1.61E-09 1.210505 -4.060443 4.836282 N =     202 
  Between  0.7864787 -1.363165 2.475432 n =      30 
  Within  0.9201356 -3.405731 4.974185 T-bar = 6.73333 
       
lbgcap Overall -0.0007644 1.349552 -4.682131 5.187386 N =     202 
 Between  0.8431895 -1.296174 2.298288 n =      30 
 Within  1.058419 -3.386721 5.332976 T-bar = 6.73333 
 
3.3 Model and Method 
The equation that will be estimated through 
the research is generally as follow: 
ExpCapit = β0 + β1IncCapit + β2BGCapit + μit                       
                 (3.1) 
where: 
ExpCapit : Local Government Expenditure per Capita 
IncCapit : Income per Capita 
BGCapit : Block Grant per Capita 
μit : Residuals (μit = λt + αi + εit) 
λt : Unobserved Time Effect 
αi : Unobserved Individual Effect 
εit : Idiosyncratic Error Term 
All of the variables are in Indonesian monetary 
unit named Rupiah (Indonesian Rupiah or IDR). 
Throughout the research, there will be a couple of 
variations implemented within in the model. For 
instance, the model that will be estimated not only 
using level-level terms, but also on log-log terms to 
provide different interpretation upon the coefficients 
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magnitude. On the log-log terms, the model will be as 
follow: 
ln(ExpCapit) = β0 + β1ln(IncCapit) + β2ln(BGCapit) 
+ μit                                (3.2) 
Both of the level-level and log-log terms 
models will also be detrended to capture the 
propensity of naturally increasing expenditure, 
income, and grants throughout the years. There are 
two options of detrending. The first is by using ordinal 
variable t that represents time; t=0 for 2004 as the 
base year, t=1 for 2005, t=2 for 2006, up to t=6 for 
2010. Then the equation will be as follow: 
ExpCapit = β0 + β1IncCapit + β2BGCapit + tt + μit          
                             (3.3) 
and 
ln(ExpCapit) = β0 + β1ln(IncCapit) + β2ln(BGCapit) 
+ tt + μit                      (3.4) 
The second way of detrending is by including annual 
dummy variables which will make the equation to be 
as follow: 
ExpCapit = β0 + β1IncCapit + β2BGCapit + δdt + μit          
                             (3.5) 
and 
ln(ExpCapit) = β0 + β1ln(IncCapit) + β2ln(BGCapit) 
+ δdt + μit                      (3.6) 
where δdt = δ1d2005 + δ2d2006 + δ3d2007 + δ4d2008 + δ5d2009 
+ δ6d2010, with the intercept (β0) represents the base 
year (2004). 
The detrending method by including the 
ordinal variable (t) is roughly similar to including year 
dummy variables. The year dummy variables can be a 
better proxy for detrending because they can be used 
to show the volatility of data throughout the years as 
well as the annual trend.  The detailed list of variable 
description is provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Variable Description 
No. Variable 
Name 
Description Formula Measurement 
1. ExpCapit Local Government Expenditure (LGE) per 
Capita of every provinces from 2004 – 
2010 
LGE/Population in rupiah 
2. IncCapit Regional GDP (RegGDP) per Capita of 
every provinces from 2004 – 2010 
RegGDP/Population in rupiah 
3. BGCapit Block Grants per Capita of every provinces 
from 2004 – 2010 
BG/Population in rupiah 
4. ln(expcapit) Natural Logarithm form of ExpCap ln(ExpCapit) in percent 
5. ln(inccapit) Natural Logarithm form of IncCap ln(IncCapit) in percent 
6. ln(bgcapit) Natural Logarithm form of BGCap ln(BGCapit) in percent 
7. t  Time; the Ordinal Variable represents 
year (0 for 2004 as the base year, 1 for 
2005, up to 6 for 2010). 
- ordinal number 
8. dt Dummy variables representing years, 
dyear1 up to dyear7.  
dyear1 = 1 for 2004 and 0 
otherwise, dyear2 = 1 for 
2005 and 0 otherwise, up 
to dyear7 = 1 for 2010 
and 0 otherwise. 
binary variable 
 
The data will be analyzed with panel data 
regression of the generalized least squares both 
random and fixed effect methods. The robust 
standard error will be incorporated to fix the 
heteroscedasticity issue. The Hausman test will be 
run to investigate the probability of correlation 
between the unobserved individual effect (αi) and the 
idiosyncratic error term (εit). From there on, it can be 
concluded which of the two effects is best. 
Indonesia is a developing economy and before 
the reformation era in 1999 the country was relatively 
closed under the old era governance of belated 
former president Soeharto for about 32 years. Due to 
such condition, Indonesia does not have many 
publicly available data. Because of that it is difficult to 
gather data to form other control variables to be 
incorporated in this research. However, the fixed 
effect regression method’s error term has controlled 
for unobservable factors that does not change over 
time (αi) therefore deals with endogeneity issue. 
The hypotheses that will be tested consist of: 
1) Both Income per Capita and Block Grant per 
Capita affects Expenditure per Capita. 
Null Hypothesis: H0: β1 = β2 = 0  
  
Alternate Hypothesis: H1: H0 is not true 
2) The existence of flypaper effect; the difference 
between Income per Capita and Block Grants per 
Capita. 
Null Hypothesis: H0: β1-β2=0  
  
Alternate Hypothesis: H1: H0 is not true 
The hypotheses are tested under the level-level 
terms, log-log terms, with or without trends and 
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robust standard errors, by both random as well as 




Table 4 presents the regression result of level-
level terms with or without trend through both 
random and fixed effects approaches. Subsequently, 
Table 5 presents similar results but with robust 
standard errors. For every result table, the star signs 
represent the level of significance of each 
independent variable; with 3 stars means significant 
at 1% significance level (α = 1%), 2 stars means 
significant at 5% significance level (α = 5%), and 1 star 
means significant at 10% significant level (α = 10%), 
and no star means insignificant or significance level is 
more than 10% (α > 10%). 
Table 6 presents the regression result of logarithm 
terms with or without trend through both random 
and fixed effects approaches. Subsequently, Table 7 
presents similar results but with robust standard 
errors. 
In testing the first hypothesis, all but one result 
show that each explanatory variable affect the 
dependent variable significantly although the 
significance level varies across regression methods. 
The only fail to reject result is the effect of linccap 
towards lexpcap within fixed effect regressions with 
robust standard error (Table 7). It shows that linccap 
does not affect lexpcap significantly. Therefore, it can 
be generally concluded that both income per capita 
and block grant per capita affect the expenditure per 
capita and it is in line with the theory.  
 




Random Effect Fixed Effect-
Detrended 
Fixed Effect 
IncCap 0.1840*** 0.1899*** 0.2035*** 0.2128*** 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.053) (0.057) 
BGCap 0.7747*** 0.7611*** 0.7571*** 0.7402*** 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) 
t -0.3764*** Not Available -0.3755*** Not Available 
 (0.073)  (0.120)  
Constant 1.7658*** 0.6889 1.7962*** 0.7143*** 
 (0.503) (0.455) (0.252) (0.154) 
Observations 202 202 202 202 
R-squared 0.976 0.972 0.976 0.972 
Number of IDprov 30 30 30 30 
 
Table 5. Level Terms Result: with/without Trend and with Robust Standard Errors  










Fixed Effect-Robust SE 
IncCap 0.1840* 0.1899* 0.2035* 0.2128 
 (0.100) (0.112) (0.119) (0.134) 
BGCap 0.7747*** 0.7611*** 0.7571*** 0.7402*** 
 (0.078) (0.089) (0.096) (0.110) 
t -0.3764*** Not Available -0.3755*** Not Available 
 (0.122)  (0.120)  
Constant 1.7658** 0.6889 1.7962*** 0.7143*** 
 (0.801) (0.486) (0.351) (0.082) 
 
Table 5. Level Terms Result: with/without Trend and with Robust Standard Errors  
(Dependent Variable: ExpCap; continued) 
 
Observations 202 202 202 202 
R-squared 0.976 0.972 0.976 0.972 
Number of IDprov 30 30 30 30 
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Table 6. Logarithm Terms Result: with/without Trend (Dependent Variable: lexpcap) 
Variables Random Effect-
Detrended 
Random Effect Fixed Effect-
Detrended 
Fixed Effect 
linccap 0.3365*** 0.2906*** 0.2427*** 0.1721* 
 (0.077) (0.079) (0.088) (0.089) 
lbgcap 0.4072*** 0.3852*** 0.2926*** 0.2539*** 
 (0.068) (0.070) (0.075) (0.077) 
t -0.1701*** 
(0.041) 
Not Available -0.1507*** 
(0.041) 
Not Available 
Constant 0.5021*** 0.0005 0.4455*** 0.0002 
 (0.155) (0.097) (0.142) (0.078) 
Observations 202 202 202 202 
R-squared 0.172 0.104 0.172 0.104 
Number of IDprov 30 30 30 30 
 
Table 7. Logarithm Terms Result: with/without Trend and with Robust Standard Errors 











linccap 0.3365*** 0.2906*** 0.2427* 0.1721 
 (0.106)  (0.086) (0.140) (0.121) 
lbgcap 0.4072*** 0.3852*** 0.2926** 0.2539** 
 (0.129) (0.106) (0.130) (0.110) 
t -0.1701** Not Available -0.1507** Not Available 
 (0.071)  (0.069)  
Constant 0.5021** 0.0005 0.4455** 0.0002** 
 (0.229) (0.109) (0.204) (0.000) 
Observations 202 202 202 202 
R-squared 0.172 0.104 0.172 0.104 
Number of IDprov 30 30 30 30 
 
In this dataset trend is proven to be significant 
under both level and logarithm terms. The individual 
year dummies are mostly insignificant yet they are 
jointly significant. The joint significance magnitude 
(the F-test value) of the year dummies is similar to the 
ordinal trend variable (t) t-statistics value. For level 
terms, the year dummies are jointly significant at 1% 
significance level while they are significant at 5% 
significance level under the logarithm terms.  
In addition, the coefficient estimate of trends 
are negative because for both level and logarithm 
terms the individual year dummies are showing 
negative trends relative to the base year (2004, the 
first year of the observation) which means that the 
dependent variables (ExpCap and lexpcap) are 
decreasing. However, we cannot say whether the 
trend is annually decreasing because the individual 
year dummies significances, sign, and magnitude of 
the coefficient estimates vary throughout the years. 
Yet, due to the joint significance of trend and year 
dummies it is important for such variables to be 
included in the regressions for both level and 
logarithm terms. The detrended coefficient estimates 
of the level terms are higher for IncCap yet lower for 
BGCap relative to the coefficient estimates without 
trend under both random and fixed effect 
regressions. On the other hand, the coefficient 
estimates of the logarithm terms are smaller for both 
linccap and lbgcap relative to their coefficient 
estimates without trend. 
Another thing to note is that the R-squared 
regressions of the level terms regressions with and 
without trend are 0.976 and 0.972 respectively. It 
generally means that the explanatory variables within 
the level terms regressions explain the variance of the 
dependent variable by more than 97%, quite a high 
explanatory power. In addition the difference 
between the regressions with and without trend of 
0.04 means that the trend variable explains the 
variance of ExpCap by approximately 4%. Graph 1, 2, 
3, and 4 depicts the relationship between each 
independent variable and the corresponding 
dependent variables. 
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Graph 1. Income per Capita (IncCap) and Expenditure 




Graph 2. Block Grant per Capita (BGCap) and 




Graph 3. Natural Logarithm of Income per Capita 




Graph 4. Natural Logarithm of Block Grant per Capita 
(lbgcap) and Natural Logrithm of Expenditure per 
Capita (lexpcap) 
 
The Hausman test for random and fixed effect 
models significantly shows the existence of 
correlation between individual effect (αi) and 
idiosyncratic error terms (εit) for both level and 
logarithm terms regressions. This resulted in 
inconsistency of the random effect regression results 
thus suggested the use of fixed effect regression 
methods because it eliminates the endogeneity 
problem that requires additional control variables. 
Yet the Hausman test is only applicable for the 
regression without robust standard errors. 
Regarding endogeneity, data for the price 
index or inflation based on provinces in Indonesia are 
not available. This may result in the nominal data 
incorporated in this research as being overstated. 
However, the inclusion of trend and fixed effect 
regressions method captured such problems. There 
are not many macroeconomics data available in 
Indonesia, especially upon provincial level, thus using 
fixed effect regressions is generally more appropriate 
in this condition. 
All of the robust standard errors are higher 
relative to the regular standard errors counterparts 
and they are robust enough to alter the significance 
of the explanatory variables within some 
methodologies. Due to the different results, it 
appears that the regressions without robust standard 
errors bear the problem of heteroskedasticity even 
though the use of panel data would have dealt with 
heteroskedasticity issue to some extent. 
Unfortunately, the panel data prohibit the post 
estimation test of heteroskedasticity existence.  
The second hypothesis testing is done through 
post estimation ‘test’ command in the statistical 
software (Stata). The test upon level terms 
regressions yield significant result of flypaper effect 
existence while the test upon logarithm terms 
regressions fail to reject the second hypothesis. Such 
results come as predicted. For the level terms 
detrended fixed effect regression the difference 
between the two main regressors of 0.56 means that 
1 rupiah increase in block grant per capita increases 
the expenditure per capita 56 cents greater than a 
similar 1 rupiah increase in income per capita. 
Furthermore, the 56 cents higher stimulatory effect 
of block grant is significantly greater than the effect 
of income per capita towards expenditure per capita 
which becomes the flypaper effect. The second 
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hypothesis testing results of the level terms 
regressions show that the existence of flypaper effect 
are very significant (significant at 1% significance 
level). 
Similar derivation can be applied towards the 
other level terms regressions results. For instance, 
the difference between the two main regressors of 
0.59 from the detrended random effect regression 
means that 1 rupiah increase in block grant per capita 
has stimulatory effect towards expenditure per capita 
59 cents greater than a similar 1 rupiah increase in 
income per capita; and the difference is very 
significant. However, due to the result of Hausman 
test it is better to use the fixed effect regressions. In 
addition, it is also better to use the detrended 
regression since the year dummy variables are jointly 
significant. 
The fail to reject result upon logarithm 
regressions does not necessarily mean inexistence of 
flypaper effect, but could be a result of the data. 
Within the logarithm terms, the second hypothesis 
test is investigating whether the difference between 
coefficient estimates of linccap and lbgcap affect 
lexpcap significantly. The coefficient estimates of 
linccap and lbgcap are not directly comparable 
because 1% change in income per capita yields 
different number than 1% change in block grant per 
capita due to difference in the initial values the two 
variables. In other words if flypaper effect exist, one 
percentage point increase in block grant per capita 
will increase the expenditure per capita higher than a 
similar increase (one percentage point) in income per 
capita. As we can see from the summary statistics of 
the variables, the mean value of block grant per 
capita is higher than the mean value of income per 
capita. Therefore, 1% change in block grant per capita 
is higher than 1% change in income per capita thus 
they cannot be directly subtracted. When they are 
being subtracted, the difference becomes 
meaningless for it does not represent a particular 
number that may affect the expenditure per capita. 
Therefore, the insignificant result of the logarithm 
terms regressions is predictable. 
The insignificance result of the logarithm 
regression terms is due to the conversion of data 
from level to percentage. Due to the initial value 
difference of the two independent variables and the 
fact that conversion into logarithm smooth out the 
level terms data, the percentage difference between 
linccap and lbgcap are incomparable for they bear 
different level (rupiah) values. Furthermore, the 
smoothing out data by the logarithm terms is shown 
in the estimation results. As we can see in from the 
detrended fixed effect results in Table 6 and 7, 1% 
increases in income per capita increase the 
expenditure per capita by approximately 0.24% while 
a similar increase in block grant per capita increases 
the expenditure per capita by approximately 0.29%. 
The estimates infers than one percentage point 
increase in either income of block grant per capita will 
yield a roughly similar results (the difference is merely 
0.05%) towards the percentage increase in 
expenditure per capita. Such result does not say 
anything about the existence of flypaper effect 
because each percentage change of the explanatory 
variables bear different rupiah values in which 
flypaper effect being evaluated. Yet the result of 
logarithm that eases up the volatility of data terms is 
useful in seeing the effects of each variable towards 
the dependent variable in a percentage terms. 
Another possible explanation for the 
inexistence flypaper effect within the logarithm terms 
can be due to the fact that grants are being used to 
finance projects that are aimed to reduce the 
expenditures of the local governments. The 
expenditure reduce is the contrary of flypaper effect 
because flypaper effect has a positive relationship 
with increase in expenditure. The result is in line with 
the trend that has negative sign which means that the 
variable has an overall decreasing trend over the 
years. Therefore, even though in level terms increase 
in block grants per capita is more simulative than a 
similar increase in income per capita, due to the 
generally decreasing trend of expenditure the 
flypaper effect is shown to be inexistence. 
Almost all of the results are significant yet due 
to significance of the trend variable and result of the 
Hausman test, the focused of the marginal effects are 
those yielded from the detrended fixed effect 
regressions. The marginal effects of the variables are 
presented in Table 8. Please note that the 
interpretations are under the assumption that other 
factors are held fixed
 
Table 8. Marginal Effects (Fixed Effect Detrended) 
No. Variable Estimation Interpretation 
1. IncCap  0.2035 Every 1 rupiah increase in Income per Capita will increase the Expenditure 
per Capita by approximately 0.2 rupiah. 
2. linccap  0.2427 Every 1 percentage point increase in Income per Capita will increase the 
Expenditure per Capita by approximately 0.24 percent. 
3. BGCap 0.7571 Every 1 rupiah increase in Block Grant per Capita will increase the 
Expenditure per Capita by approximately 0.76 rupiah. 
4. lbgcap 0.2926 Every 1 percentage point increase in Block Grant per Capita will increase 
the Expenditure per Capita by approximately 0.29 percent. 
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The elasticity of the mean values resulted 
income per capita elasticity of 0.15 and block grant 
per capita elasticity of 0.66 with respect to income 
per capita. In addition, First Difference regression 
analyses were also being implemented for the 
dataset and it yields similar results with the random 
effect panel data regression method. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
From the result, several conclusions can be 
taken: 
1. Both Income per Capita and Block Grant per 
Capita affect Expenditure per Capita significantly. 
The correlations are positive which means that 
both income effect and price effect increase the 
expenditure of the provinces. The results are 
significant thus in line with the prevailing 
theories of the flypaper existence. 
2. Block Grant per Capita affect Expenditure per 
Capita more than Income per Capita affect 
ExpCap. 
From the detrended fixed effect regressions, one 
rupiah increase in BGCap increases the ExpCap by 
approximately 76 cents while 1 rupiah increase in 
IncCap increases ExpCap by approximately 20 
cents. The difference shows that BGCap 
stimulates the increase in ExpCap 56 cents 
greater than a similar 1 rupiah increase in IncCap. 
It shows that BGCap affects ExpCap more than 
the effect of IncCap.   
3. The Flypaper Effect Existed in Indonesia within 
2004 – 2010. 
Flypaper Effect exists under the level-level terms 
but undetermined under log-log terms 
regressions. The level terms results are very 
significant. It shows that increase in block grant 
per capita increase the expenditure per capita 
greater than a similar increase in income per 
capita. The cumulative effect will be even greater 
as the disparity between increase in BGCap and 
IncCap gets larger. The existence of flypaper 
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